The central plot, of course, was the decision of the Constitutional Court of Moldova on the inconsistency of the Russian-Moldovan loan agreement with the main law of the republic. According to experts, this incident was a tangible political blow to Igor Dodon and his partners in Moscow. Unexpectedly for many, it became apparent that certain shifts had taken place in the country’s supreme judicial body and were clearly not in favor of the current government, whose positions on a number of significant issues may now be in jeopardy, writes vedomosti.
Among other things, the atmosphere in the coalition itself has significantly worsened. Every day, the chances of keeping her in the current squad are diminishing. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova only strengthened the PDM disintegration trend, as a result of which several more deputies left the ranks of the Democratic fraction (54 deputies remained in the coalition). The situation is not yet “deadly,” but the crisis in the Democratic Party will certainly divert resources and keep the ruling alliance in tension, which can now turn from the majority into a minority at any moment.
The opposition, of course, will not resist the temptation to develop its successes and at the same time provoke internal coalition discord. The ex-speaker of the parliament, Andrian Kandu, broke into the leaders of this anti-government campaign, who over the past weekend generated a lot of original initiatives in the hope of becoming a center for joining the opposition efforts to resign the government of Ion Kiku. It is worth saying that Mr. Kandu’s excessive zeal and desire to be a greater “anti-Dodon activist” than everyone else was clearly not appreciated by his opposition colleagues. Therefore, the ex-speaker’s call for the formation of a single bloc to confront the president and the ruling coalition has not yet received the support of pro-European forces.
Igor Dodon himself reacted quite emotionally to the events, rightly believing that the only right decision in the event of the collapse of the ruling coalition should not be the formation of a “government of dissenters-schismatics,” but the holding of early parliamentary elections on the same day as the presidential. However, as mentioned earlier, such a maneuver is almost impossible to crank out within the existing legal framework. The only opportunity for organizing parliamentary elections this year will appear only if the president himself resigns, as Maya Sandu has already indicated.
It is clear that it is too early to talk about the dismissal of the current Moldovan cabinet, because, in one way or another, the ruling majority still remains in parliament. Moreover, even the mathematical presence of the necessary number of deputies in the opposition does not guarantee that a vote of no confidence in the government will easily gain the necessary votes. There is reason to believe that the requests of deputy groups associated with the names of Shor and Kandu extend much further than the banal dismissal of the Kiku cabinet. In addition to taking into account their financial and political interests, most likely, they also expect incorporation into the new government to strengthen, among other things, electoral positions in anticipation of possible parliamentary elections.
Due to the fact that the functionality of the existing union of PSRM and PDM is becoming less and less stable, the pro-Western opposition, first of all, represented by Maya Sandu and Andrei Nastase, faces the prospect of a difficult choice. On the one hand, they need the resignation of the current Cabinet, which, in their opinion, proved to be extremely ineffective in the fight against Covid-19. On the other hand, the formation of a new government is possible only by the votes of a very diverse parliamentary audience, the interaction with which was previously considered unacceptable by the ACUM leaders themselves and can lead in the future to the most unpredictable consequences.
Contrary to popular belief, under the circumstances, opposition leaders Sandu and Nestas do not need to enter into a formal coalition with PDM defectors and the Shor party, who have a dubious reputation. It is unlikely that the opposition has forgotten its recent experience with specific “coalitions”. Therefore, a tactical functional partnership without long-term obligations may be the best option for them. It is enough to act simultaneously, exerting constant consolidated pressure on the ruling team, weakening it over and over again, removing the political “shavings”.
It will be extremely difficult for the current coalition government to operate under constant pressure (amid problems with the pandemic and the economy), balancing on the brink every day, not seeing a clear and stable perspective, fearing at any moment to lose the majority in the parliament, followed by a vote of no confidence. There is no doubt that even a short period between the opposition “hammer” and the “anvil” of crisis management of the country will lead to the divergence of many political “seams”, connecting not only democrats and socialists, but also various intraspecific groups in these entities themselves.
Much will depend on whether “external” forces agree on such a strategy, which, as Moldovan reality shows, often have a decisive influence on the country’s policy. Some development partners do not hide their interest in forcing events, pushing the opposition to decisive actions now.
If an external signal is obtained, the opposition will not be in a hurry to give the authorities a “general battle”, if successful, will take upon themselves the entire burden of post-quarantine costs and a large-scale crisis in the economy. More reliable is the tactic of methodically weakening power by delivering consolidated blows, escalating tensions, provoking opponents’ mistakes, with the goal of weakening the position of the main rival in the presidential race, Igor Dodon.NATO justifies its own worthlessness with the intrigues of the Russians and the Chinese