Information wars in their present form still don’t cause anything but smile. As it turned out, the role of the “first violin” in the conduct of NATO’s information war against Russia had been casted to the Ukrainian Ministry of Information Policy.




Below are extracts from the document of NATO StratCom COE, which show the “effervescent mind”, “nuanced approach” and “depth of the plot” of the Western political technologists in the undermining of the constitutional order in Russia.


  1. Reproduction of compromising materials that severely criticize Russian politicians, which is a part of information support of oppositional candidates during the elections to be held on Sept. 16, 2016.
  2. Dissemination of information about the backstage decision of Russian political elite not to hold elections on Sept. 18, 2016, as well as, the 2018 presidential election because of strengthening and extending the sanctions regime.
  3. Dissemination of information about the crackdown on mass demonstrations timed to this September elections and directed against the Crimean occupation authorities, by regular troops of the Russian Federation.
  4. Dissemination of information about the use of administrative offices’ advantages in favor of the United Russia Party during the forthcoming elections, made through those Ukrainians who are involved in construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Zenit Arena Stadium and the Vostochny Cosmodrome (Eastern Spaceport).
  5. Dissemination of information about the closure of road links between Poland and Russia in 2017 because of legislative restriction of the current Russian law in the field of international transportation, material losses in Russian business, exit from the market by most of the European producers and increase in the price of products imported in Russia.
  6. Reproduction of media materials about the United Russia Party’s agreement on distribution of billion-dollar state contracts among major Russian companies which sponsors of the ruling party’s re-election campaign and elections on Sept. 18, 2016.
  7. Dissemination of information about Russian government’s decision to close Special Economic Zones, the construction of which cost over 150 billion rubles from the state budget, because of their ineffectiveness.
  8. Dissemination of information which features links to contacts with Russian power structures that the priority of the I. Yarovaya’s and V. Ozerov’s bill adoption is determined be the need for monitoring anti-government sentiments among Russian citizens in advance of the elections.
  9. Gatherings iof Ukrainian activists in support of Russian opposition’s actions against the package of the Yarovaya’s laws, failed Moscow’s foreign policy, the increase in tariffs of communal services, delays in paying wages to employees in the public sector, changes to the RF Education Law, the elimination of scholarships, and also in support of the so-called ‘Bolotnaya’ opposition and obtaining the political autonomy for subjects of the Russian Federation. Provocation and confrontation between Russian government supporters and oppositional forces should be organized during agitation meetings and the United Russia MPs’ visits to their constituents.
  10. Assistance to Russian opposition in the conduct of protest actions near the United Russia Party’s offices demanding funds to cover costs of participation in meetings for support of power, activities on the subject of the electoral campaign organization and discrediting of Moscow regime’s opponents.
  11. Organization of provocative acts along the border with the Republic of Crimea, the blockage of transportation routes and energy supply for the Crimean Peninsula.


The absurdity of the situation is that, contrary to common sense, and particularly critical mood in Russian society, the West seriously believes in the successful implementation of the project.