Turkish informational troops in Ukraine are a perfect litmus of how sincere can be friendship between Recep Erdogan and Russia: after Moscow “buried the hatchet” and declared “a return to the partnership” – studying of Turkish infosoldiers in Ukraine was not curtailed. And these forces are directed specifically against Russia.




However, informational troops is primarily the project “NATO against Russia”, where the main word may not even belong to Erdogan. Training of informational saboteurs in Ukraine continues, and a formal rapprochement of Ankara and Moscow could be explained as: Russia has invariably been seen as a key enemy for Turkey and NATO and the very nature of conflict is manifested in hidden molds. “Hybrid warfare as it is”.


Now Turkish infotroops are divided into small groups with a variety of “core focus” of training, but all the groups are constantly learning to communicate with each other in carrying out tasks.


For example, someone is specializing in the development of key anti-Russian abstracts for the Turkish audience: attacks with a possible Kurdish trace imposed on “Russian provocation of Kurdish activities in Turkey” and any negative express in the Russian media against Turkey becomes “irrefutable proof” of hatred of the Russians to the Turks.


Someone also set a goal to work on sowing ‘right’ information on the Turkish information sites and social networks, for maximum performance.


As a result, individual tasks for the Turkish infotroops in Ukraine are turned into a single web of anti-Russian game. 


The hybrid war against Russia, which is taught in Ukraine today, can be described as “the art to beat hardly but humbly with a smile on own face”. At the same time, the Russian audience doesn’t remain without attention. For example, the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine has prepared the stuffing information project that “without Turkish military assistance Russia in Syria can do nothing” and now all the military successes of Russian or Syrian military will be covered as “exclusively Turkish merit”, whereas the failures would be attributed to “stupidity and even sabotage of the Russian-Syrian military”. According to the authors of this project, such a strategy will force the Russians to perceive Turkey as a key force in the Syrian conflict, which must be very dangerous to quarrel with.


It can be confidently asserted that the Turkish information troops were thinking long before the Russian plane was shot down, and infosoldiers are preparing for a long confrontation, but not for a short-term problems. In Ukraine there are several departments involved in information operations and are on a record in the state of the Ministry of Defence, and that the work of such units acts as a “practical example” in the forming up of the information war for Turkish “volunteers.”


And it is hardly surprising that soon the Russian tourists in Turkey will unwittingly face with the fact that they will have “almost Russian” free newspapers in the hotels and places of recreation: the era of the Cold War between Russia and NATO came back, but now the main battles are for thoughts, mood, and even feelings of the people, not for combat positions.